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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Were the Appellant's Constitutional rights
violated when he was sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration without receiving credit for pre-trial incarceration?
2.

Are individuals entitled to credit for pre-

conviction incarceration against any sentence?

iv
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
-vDANNY RICHARDS,

Case No. 20580

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Danny P.ichards
for assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-102 (1953 as amended).

Mr. Richards pled guilty

to the charge on February 28, 1985 in the Third District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay
E. Banks, Judge, presiding. Mr. Richards was sentenced by the
same court to the maximum term of six months incarceration
without receiving credit for the period of pre-conviction
incarceration which he had served.
Statement of Facts
On December 15, 1984 Mr. Richards was arrested for
Aggravated Assault, a felony (R.21).

He was incarcerated in

the Salt Lake County jail, unable to Dost bail, and remained
there throughout the preceedings against him (R. 4,5,41,56).
He was, at the time of his arrest, an indigent person who
owned no property other than his clothes and had no employment
or any source of income.

In view of this financial status
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Mr. Richards was assigned court appointed counsel. He had
several bond hearings but was never able to post the bail
that was set (R. 4,5,12,13,23,28,35,41,56,64).
On February 28, 1985, while still in custody, Mr.
Richards pled guilty to assault, a Class B Misdemeanor and
a lesser and included offense of the original charge against
him (T. 17, R. 36,37).

On March 8, 1985 he was sentenced to

serve six months in the County Jail and to make restitution.
(T. 20-21, R. 51). Six months is the maximum time allowed
by law for a Class B Misdemeanor , §76-3-204, Utah Code
Annotated.

The Court: gave him nine days credit for time

served, from the day he entered his plea of guilty, despite
his request for credit for the time served since his initial
incarceration, an additional seventy-five (75) days.

(T.21)

On April 5, 1985, Mr. Richards filed a Notice of Appeal . On
April 8, 1985 he filed in the Third District Court a Motion
to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to §77-35-22 (e) or
in the alternative a Petition for a Certificate of Probable
Cause pursuant to §77-35-27, Utah Code Annotated, (R.56,57).
This motion was heard by Judge Banks on April 12, 1985 and
denied (R.67. A) .
On April 25, 1985, Mr. Richards through counsel, filed
an Application for a Certificate of Probable Cause and a Motion
to stay any sentence in excess of six months with this Court.
That motion was heard and granted by this Court on May 6, 1985.
Mr. Richards was released from jail on June 15, 1935, six
months after his initial arrest and incarceration.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellant, Danny Richards, first contends
that his sentence, which was for the maximum statutory
term, was an illegal sentence. The sentence was illegal
because of the failure of the trial court to give credit
for the significant period of pre-trial incarceration which
the Appellant had served.

The effect of such a sentence

was to create a new maximum sentence for the offense which
was longer than the maximum term provided by statute.

Such

a sentence denied the Appellant equal protection of the laws
by establishing two different maximum terms of incarceration one term for those eligible for pre-trial release (through
either bail or Mown recognizance" release) and another term
for those unable to secure such a release.

The effect was

to discriminate against Mr. Richards because of his indigent
status.

Further, the sentence was illegal because it

violated Constitutional prohibitions against dual punishment
for the same offense.
The Appellant further contends that any sentence
which fails to apply credit for a term of pre-trial
incarceration is an illegal sentence. This contention
is also based on equal protection rationale and the
Constitutional prohibition against double punishment.

-3-
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I

:

MR RICHARDS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED
TO THE "MAXIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION
WITHOUT RECEIVING CREDIT FOR PRE-TRIAL
INCARCERATION.
'
. ,,.., .. ,., ..,,
The Appellant contends that the trial court's sentence,
which failed to consider or credit the period of pre-conviction
incarceration, is an illegal sentence. The sentence, as given
by the trial court, will result in Mr. Richards' serving 75
days longer than the statutory maximum term for a Class B
misdemeanor, (See Addendum A).

Consequently, the sentence

denies Mr. Richards1 equal Drotection of the laws and violates
Constitutional prohibitions against dual punishment. This
contention is predicated on the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018,
26 L.Ed.2d. 586 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.
Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d. 130 (1971).

These cases hold that Equal

Protection considerations prohibit a state from subjecting
certain classes of individuals to terms of incarceration longer
than the statutory maximum.

The Court determined that Equal

Protection was denied when such extended confinement resulted
from the inability to meet the pecuniary provisions of a
sentence.
theft.

In Williams, the defendant was convicted of petty

He subsequently received the statutory maximum sentence

of one year imprisonment, a $500.00 fine and $5.00 in court
costs.

The defendant petitioned the sentencing judge to vacate
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that portion of the order requiring that he remain in prison
after expiration of the one year term.

Defendant did not

have the money to pay the fine and court costs. Under Illinois
law, he would have remained in prison and "worked off" his
$505.00 deficit at a rate of $5.00 a day. Under this scheme,
the defendant would have been imprisoned 101 days longer than
the statutory term for his offense.

The sentencing judge

denied the petition to vacate and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed.

The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment

on Equal Protection grounds and stated that: "Once the State
has defined the outer limits of incarceration...it may not
then subject a class of convicted defendants to a period of
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of
their indigency."

Williams, 26 L.Ed.2d at 59 3.

In Tate, decided one year later, the Petitioner had been
convicted of a traffic violation punishable by fines only.
The accumulative fine was $425.00* Petitioner, because he was
an indigent, could not pay the fines. Pursuant to a Texas
statute, the trial court had ordered him imprisoned for 85
days.

While in prison, the petitioner was to "work off" the

fine at a rate of $5.00 a day. The County Criminal Court
denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Texas Court of
Criminal appeals affirmed, rejecting Petitioner's claim that
his imprisonment was unconstitutional.
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

The United States

Relying on the Williams

Equal Protection rationale the Court in Tate held that "the
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective
of their economic status."

Tate, 28 L.Ed.2d. at 133 (quoting

Williams v. Illinois, 26 L.Ed. 2d. 586 ,594 (1970)).
Following the equal protection rationale of the
Williams and Tate decisions, both state and federal courts have
examined what has been termed the "logical extensions" of those
holdings. A majority of these courts have taken the position
that once a defendant is sentenced to the statutory maximum
term, he or she is entitled to credit for ANY pre-trial
incarceration that resulted from the financial inability to
post bail.

The equal protection argument common to this

position is perhaps best illustrated in the case of Reanier
v. Smith, 517 P.2d. 949 (Wash. 1974).

In this consolidated

decision, two of the four cases summarily decided by the court
••* dealt with fact situations identical to those at issue here.
The first was Rinehart v. Smith, 517 P. 2d. 949 (Wash. 1974).
In that case the defendant was taken into custody on December 8,
1969 and charged with second degree burglary.
indigency, he was unable to post bail.

Due to his

Consequently, he remained

in jail until March 31, 1970, when he was sentenced to the
statutory maximum term of fifteen years. He did not receive
credit for the four and one-half months he spent in jail prior to
trial.

The second case was Woods v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash.

1974).

In that case the defendant was arrested on October 1,
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1969 and placed in jail pursuant to a narcotics charge.
He too was unable to post bail and remained incarcerated.
On March 23, 1970 he was convicted and sentenced to the
maximum term of twenty years and the mandatory minimum
term of five years. He did not receive credit for the five
and half months of pre-trial detention he served.

In holding

that Equal Protection mandates that indigent defendants be
granted credit for such pre-trial incarceration, the Supreme
Court of Washington reasoned that:
Otherwise, such a person!s total time
in custody would exceed that of a
defendant likewise sentenced but who
had been able to obtain pre-trial
release. Thus, two sets of maximum
and mandatory minimum terms would be
erected, one for those unable to procure
pre-trail release from confinement and
another for those fortunate enough to
obtain such release.
Id. at 951.
A federal decision with a similar holding is
Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d.1172 (9th Cir. 1974).

The facts

of Hook again parallel those in the present case.

In that

case, the appellant was arrested for forgery with a credit
card.

Because he could not post bail, he remained incarcerated

until 236 days later, he was convicted and received the
statutory maximum sentence of ten years. He filed a Writ of
Habeas Corpus requesting that he be granted credit on his
sentence for his pre-sentence confinement. The Ninth Circuit
Court upheld his writ and held that the defendant was entitled
to credit for his pre-trial incarceration.

The Ninth Circuit

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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followed the Williams rationale and came to the conclusion
that:
Time a defendent SDends in jail before
sentence because he is unable to raise
bond must be credited if he is later
sentenced to a maximum term.
[T]he inability of an indigent criminal
defendant to make bond should not
result in extending the duration of his
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum.
496 F.2d 1174 (Quoting 449 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir.
1971)).
Applying these cases to the present case leads to
the conclusion that Mr. Richards is entitled to receive
credit for his 75 days of pre-trial incarceration.

Failure

to grant Mr. Richards credit results in a denial of equal
protection.

Mr. Richards would be forced to serve a longer

sentence than would a richer defendant similarly situated
who had been able to raise bail for pre-trial release.
For other state and federal decisions following
this reasoning see:Jackson v. Alabama, 536 F.2d. 113 (5th
Cir. 1976); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.SUDD 416 (D.C.N.C. 1971);
Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1972); Hart v.
Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Games, 499 F.2d 143 (2nd Cir. 1971); Godbold v. Wilson,
518 F.Supp 1265 (D.C. Colo. 1981); Brown v. Beto, 359 F.Supp.
118 (D.C. Tex 1973); Monsour v. Gray, 375 F.Supp. 786 (D.C. Wis.
1973); In Re Young, 107 Cal Rptr

915 (1973); State v. Sutton,

518 P.2d. 590, 521 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Cook, 679
P.2d, 413 (Wash. App. 1984); Anglin v. State, 525 P.2d 34
(Nev. 1975).
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The Utah Supreme Court considered this issue in the
case of State v. Winning, 531 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1975).

The facts

of the Winning case parallel those of Mr. Richard's.

In that

case, the defendant was arrested on June 11, 1974 pursuant to
a charge of automobile theft, a second degree felony.

Because

defendant was unable to secure bail, he remained in jail until
August 30, 1974. At that time he pled guilty to a Class A
misdemeanor and was sentenced to the statutory maximum term
of one year.

From the time he was first incarcerated until

the time he was sentenced, the defendant had spent 70 days in
jail.

In its holding, the Utah Supreme Court refused defendant's

request that he be granted credit for the 70 days.

However, in

reaching this decision, the court did not take into consideration
the Equal Protection standard of the Williams and Tate line
of cases. Rather, the court reached its decision bv distinguishing
the facts of Winning from those of North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed. 2d. 656 (1969).

The

refusal to grant credit was based on the Utah Supreme Court's
view at that time that the Pearce double jeopardy rationale
was inapplicable to the fact situation of Winning.

In Pearce

the respondent had been convicted of assault with intent to
commit rape. He was sentenced to a term of 12-15 years. While
serving the sentence, petitioner appealed his conviction.
As a result, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed
his conviction.

He was subsequently re-tried, convicted and

sentenced to a term of eight years. The eight years, when
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added to the time petitioner already served, "amounted to a
longer total sentence then that originally imposed".
23 L.Ed.2d at 65 7.

Pearce

The United States Supreme Court stated

that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against multiple
punishments "requires that punishment already exacted must be
fully 'credited1 in imposing sentence upon a new conviction
for the same offense" Pearce, 23 L.Ed.2d at 657. The Utah
Supreme Court, in holding the Pearce double jeopardy rationale
inapplicable, stated "In the case before us, the Defendant
was awaiting trial and disposition of his case rather than
undergoing punishment" Winning, 531 P.2d at 1303.

In other woi

the Utah Supreme Court based its decision on the view
that pre-trial incarceration is not punishment.
is against the clear weight of authority.

This position

For this reason, the

Utah Supreme Court's holding in Winning should be overturned.
Several federal courts, as well as state courts, have
refused to distinguish between pre-trial detention and postconviction punishment.

One such case is the District Court of

North Carolina's decision in Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.SUDP. 416
(D.C.N.C. 1971).

In Culp, the defendant, like Mr. Richards,

was incarcerated for a period prior to trial and later given
the statutory maximum sentence.

The District Court applied

.the Pearce rationale and held that:

r •

,.;.

Culp shall be given credit for time
spent in custody prior to commitment
where he has been given a maximum
sentence. Pre-trial detention is nothing
less than punishment. An unaccused who
is not allowed or can not raise bail is
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

^f

deprived of his liberty. His
incarceration is indistinguishable
in effect from that of one... who is
^.
retried after obtaining post conviction
relief. In both instances, the power
of the State has been utilized to punish...
Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
See, also Wright v Maryland Pennitentiary, 429 F.2d
1101 (4th Cir. 1970); Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284
(4th Cir. 1971); Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash 1974).
These cases uniformly hold that pre-sentence incarceration
constitutes punishment for fifth amendment purposes.
The fifth amendment rationale employed by the United
States Supreme Court in Pearce is as follows:

"The

Constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for
the same offense absolutely requires that punishment exacted
must be fully 'credited1 in imposing sentence upon a new
conviction for the same offense."23 L.Ed.2d at 665.
Since pre-trial incarceration is equivalent to nunishment
under the fifth amendment, failure to grant credit for such
incarceration is a violation of Constitutional guarantees
against dual punishment.

Thus, failure to grant Mr. Richards

credit for his seventy-five days of pre-trial incarceration
is a violation of the prohibition against dual punishment
as well as a denial of equal protection. See Reanier v. Smith,
517 P.2d 949 (1974); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp 416 (D.C.N.C.
1971); State v. Phelan, 617 P.2d 1212 (Wash 1983).

All three

of these cases follow the extension of the Pearce fifth
amendment rationale which includes credit for pre-trial
incarceration.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In addition to the case law, other authority supports
the Appellant's position.

For example, Model Penal Code

§7.09 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) in essence states
that when an individual is incarcerated nrior to trial, and
subsequently sentenced to the statutory maximum he is entitled
to full credit for his pre-trial incarceration.

(Addendum B)

Another provision following this rationale is the American
Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives
and Procedures, Standard 18-4.7 (Approved Draft 1968; 1982 Supp).
This section provides that credit should be awarded as against
the imposition of the statutory maximum term for any incarceration
that results from a criminal charge. The American Bar
Association said that such credit should specifically include
time spent in custody prior to trial.

(Addendum C)

18 U.S.C. §3585 contains similar language.

In addition

(Addendum D).

That

provision states that a defendant must be given credit for
any term of incarceration that is a result of the offense of
which he is convicted.
In the present case, Mr. Richards, because of his
financial inability to post bail, would be forced to spend
75 days in jail beyond the statutory maximum of six months
for a Class B misdemeanor.

Failure to grant Mr. Richards

credit for such incarceration will violate Constitutional
standards in two ways..

First, it denies Mr. Richards equal

-12-
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protection of the laws.

Second, it violates constitutional

prohibitions against dual punishment.

In light of the case

law and other provisions discussed above, Mr, Pvichards is
entitled to receive credit for his pre-trial incarceration.
POINT II
INDIVIDUALS ARE ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR
PRE-CONVICTION INCARCERATION ARISING OUT
OF INABILITY TO POST BAIL AS AGAINST ANY
SENTENCE IMPOSED.
As previously stated, the Tate v. Short, supra,
Williams v. Illinois, supra equal protection rationale
has been extended by numerous courts. These courts have
uniformly held that where a defendant is sentenced to the
maximum term proscribed by statute, he is entitled to credit
for pre-sentence incarceration.
the Williams

and Tate

Several courts have taken

rationale one step further and have

held that Equal Protection requires that pre-trial incarceration,
resulting from the inability to post bail, must be credited
as against ANY post conviction sentence regardless of whether
or not the sum of sentence and pre-trial incarceration is
beyond the statutory maximum.

Two such recent cases are

State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d. 1212 (Wash. 1983) and Godbold v.
Wilson, 513 F.Supp. 1265 (D.C. Colo-1981).

The equal

protection basis for this position is probably best illustrated
by the District Court of Colorado in the Godbold decision.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested on June 29, 1979.
He was unable to post bail and remained incarcerated until his
trial.

On October 11, 1979, petitioner was found guilty of

attempted Digitized
felony
theft which carried a maximum sentence of
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of five years and third degree assault which carried a
maximum sentence of two years. On December 20, 1979, ;
petitioner was sentenced to two to four years for the first
offense and twelve months for the second.

The trial judge

refused to grant petitioner credit for the 174 days of presentence incarceration.

The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed

and held that there was no constitutional right to credit.
See Godbold v. District Court, 623 p.2d 862 (Colo. 1981).
The Federal District Court of Colorado held that petitioner
was entitled to credit for his 174 days of pre-sentence
confinement.

The District Court followed the rationale

propounded by Colorado Supreme Court Justice Quinn in his dissent in
Godbold v. District Court, sunra. The District Court found
that cases such as this may differ from Williams, supra
and Tate^ supra in that Mthe defendant is not be be confined
longer than the statutory maximum."

518 F. Supn at 1269.

But the court followed the equal protection rationale and
recognized that f![t]he consequences to the defendant are the
same however:

the indigent is forced to serve a longer term

in prison than the non-indigent solely because of his poverty11.
Id. 518 F. Supp. at 1269 (Quoting 623 P.2d at 866). Under this
broadened extension of Williams and Tate, it is clear that
Mr. Richards would be entitled to credit for his 75 days of
pre-trial incarceration as against any term of imprisonment.
In addition, four of the five federal circuit courts
which have had occasion to decide the issue have followed the
broadened extension of Williams and Tate, indicating a clear
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

majority and trend in favor of this position.

See

Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1977);
King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1975); Ham v.
North Carolina, 471 F.2d.406,408 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Gaines, 494 F.2d, 143 (2nd Cir. 1971).

Only one

circuit court which has ruled on this issue has held that
there is no constitutional right to credit.
Dees, 579 F.2d 929, 931

See Mathews v.

(5th Cir. 1978).

Failure to credit any sentence x^ith pre-trial
incarceration has been held to violate Constitutional
prohibitions against dual punishments as well.

A recent,

and well reasoned decision so holding is the Supreme Court
of Washington's decision in State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d. 1212
(Wash. 1983).

In Phelan, the defendant was arrested and

convicted of second degree rape. Prior to his conviction,
defendant spent fourteen months in jail.

Mr. Phelan was

originally given credit against his maximum term for the
fourteen months plus four months of "good time". However,
on the State's motion for reconsideration, the Court deleted
the good time credit.

Defendant than sought an order from

the Supreme Court of Washington that he be given credit for
his jail time against his discretionary minimum term as well.
After exhaustive analysis of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra,
Justice Utter, writing for the majority, extended the Pearce
rationale into this area.

In doing .so, he came to the conclusion

that M[pjrior incarceration not only must be credited against
a maximum sentence, but must be credited on ANY sentence
imposed."
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671 P.2d at 1216 (emphasis added).

The court then went on to quote the following passage
from Pearce, as the basis for its holding:
The constitutional violation is flagrantly
apparent in a case involving the imposition
of a maximum sentence after reconviction...
though not so dramatically evident, the same
principle obviously holds true whenever
punishment already endured is not fully
subtracted from any new sentence imposed.

L

Id. at 1216, quoting 23 L.Ed.2d at 665. The Washington Supreme
Court had already held nine years earlier in Reanier, supra, that pre
trial incarceration was in fact punishment.

In light of this

position, the court held that the above quoted language
"mandates credit not only against maximum and mandatory
minimum terms but against discretionary minimum terms as well."
671 P.2d at 1216 (emphasis added) The effect of this holding is
that pre-trial incarceration must be credited against any sentence
imposed.
CONCLUSION
The appellant asks this court to find that it was
a violation of his constitutional rights to sentence him to
the maximum term of incarceration without giving him credit
for pre-trial detention when he was unable to post bail.
Further the appellant asked this court to find that it was
a violation of his constitutional rights to deny him credit
for his pre-trial detention whether he was sentenced to the
maximum term for the crime for which he was convicted or not.
The appellant asks this Court to remand this case to the
Third District Court and direct the Third District Court to
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correct its illegal sentence and to give Mr. Richards credit
for the seventy-five days he served on this case before his
conviction.
f4—
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1985
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76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment.—A person
who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding
one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding
six months;
(3) In the case of a claas C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding
ninety days.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-204, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-3-204.

Collateral References.
Criminal Law©=1208(l).
24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1986.
21 Am. Jur. 2d 551, Criminal Law § 590.
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§ 7.08

SENTENCING AUTHORITY OF COURT

^ j

provision of federal law that permits a commitment for evaluation
of up to six months,17 and the extension of the period to ont year
should not disturb this apparent acceptance.18 On grounds of
policy, there is no substantial reason why a defendant should bo
protected against a possible reconsideration and increase of s son*
tence that has proven erroneous, especially in view of tht ft*
quirement that the error be brought to light within a year. Tim
minimal unfairness that might be thought to inhere in tht post*
ponement of certainty for one year is more than offset by tht
gains to the system of correcting a serious mistake in tht rait
case when the power will be used. If the court exercises Its
power to resentence the offender, full credit is awarded for actual
time served under the prior sentence, as well as credit for any
good time earned.
5. Finality of Original Sentence. Subsection (6) establishes
that the offender's original sentence is final for all purposes other
than resentencing, i.e., the taking of appeal, or instituting a col*
lateral attack on conviction. Subsection (7) further provides that
all remedies provided by law for correcting an illegal sentence
are preserved.
Section 7.09. Credit for Time of Detention Prior to Sentence; Credit
for Imprisonment Under Earlier Sentence for Same
Crime.*
(1) When a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment has
previously been detained in any state or local correctional or other
institution following his [conviction of] [arrest for] the crime for
case concerned the entirely different problem of resentencing following rtConvlcUfla>
the procedural aspects of Section 7.08 clearly meet the due process concern* expritMa
by Justice Stewart. Cf. Low, Special Offender Sentencing, 8 Am.Crim.L.Q. 7 JJ»*"
94 (1970), for discussion of some of the constitutional issues raised on the • n m l ^ *
question of whether the prosecutor should be entitled to appeal a sentence for the PJ"T**J
of seeking an increase. See also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1971); UlUUtf
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
17

See note 2 supra.

18

The Model Code's approach is also supported by those of the m o r e * " ^ 4 ^
habitual offender laws that have permitted resentence at any time on proof of w»
requisite prior convictions. Relevant statutes are collected in Spencer Ve,Tef1,l^||A
U.S. 554, 586-87 n.ll (1967) (dissenting opinion). See also the d * ^ ^ . ? ? ?
Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 5.5 Commentary H * ^ v i * £
proved Draft 1968); 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18-6.5 Commenury m
18-470 to -472 (2d ed. 1980).
* History. Presented to the Institute in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 ind *W**T'
at the May 1961 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 345 (1961). ^ * * t e d **f" W SJJ
Institute in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 1962 meeting.
ALI Proceedings 226-27 (1962).
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Art. 7

CREDIT FOR TIME OF DETENTION

§ 7.09

which such sentence is imposed, such period of detention following
his [conviction] [arrest] shall be deducted from the maximum term,
and from the minimum, if any, of such sentence. The officer
having custody of the defendant shall furnish a certificate to the
Court at the time of sentence, showing the length of such detention
of the defendant prior to sentence in any state or local correctional
or other institution, and the certificate shall be annexed to the
official records of the defendant's commitment.
(2) When a judgment of conviction is vacated and a new sentence
is thereafter imposed upon the defendant for the same crime, the
period of detention and imprisonment theretofore served shall be
deducted from the maximum term, and from the minimum, if any,
of the new sentence. The officer having custody of the defendant
shall furnish a certificate to the Court at the time of sentence,
showing the period of imprisonment served under the original sentence, and the certificate shall be annexed to the official records
of the defendant's new commitment.
Explanatory Note
Subsection (1) establishes the defendant's right to credit against
his ultimate sentence for time served prior to the imposition of
the sentence as a result of the same criminal charge. A certificate is required to be furnished to the court and to the correctional officials showing the length of any such detention.
Subsection (2) covers the case where the defendant's original
conviction or sentence has been vacated, and where a new trial
has resulted in a second conviction for an offense based upon the
same conduct. In such a case the defendant is entitled to credit
against his new sentence for time served on the previous sentence,
against both the minimum and the maximum of his new term.
Again, a certificate procedure is established to assure that the
credit is awarded.
Comment1
1. Presentence Custody. Subsection (1) requires that time
served as a result of a criminal charge prior to the imposition of
sentence for a conviction on that charge should be credited against
the sentence ultimately imposed. The bracketed portions of the
proposal indicate some flexibility as to the starting point for computing the time to be credited against the ultimate sentence. The
+

With a few exceptions, research ended Oct. 1, 1979. For the key to abbreviated
citations used for enacted and proposed penal codes throughout footnotes, see p. xxxi
supra.
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§ 7.09

SENTENCING AUTHORITY OF COURT

Art, 7

position of the Code's Reporters was that arrest is the proper
starting point since the bulk of the period of presentence detention
is likely to occur between arrest and trial, and relatively little
between conviction and sentence. All of the jurisdictions that
grant credit commence the period with the arrest. 1 The American Bar Association and the National Advisory Commission agree
that credit for the period from arrest should be given.2 If the
defendant is committed for a presentence study, Section 7.08(1)
requires that the period of such commitment also be deducted
from any imprisonment sentence.
Subject to the reservation as to whether the point of beginning
is arrest or conviction, Section 7.09 would assure that time already served by an offender, although prior to his formal sentencing, will go toward satisfying any sentence of imprisonment
that is imposed.3 The unfavorable conditions that frequently
characterize such presentence detention emphasize the justice of
this requirement. 4 The mandatory credit will limit the dispositional powers of the court in relatively few cases, namely, when
the court wishes to impose the longest possible minimum or maximum term and the time previously served and to be credited will
result in actual service in the institution of a lesser period.5 The
limit is plainly called for if the statutory maximum terms are to
have their proper effect. If five years is the legislatively fixed
maximum for a given offense, it would be inappropriate for a
defendant to be required to serve six years as a result of having
been in custody for one year prior to the imposition of the five
year maximum. In regard to the minimum, however, it has been
1
See Appendix to this Comment. See also Annot., Right to Credit for Time Spent
in Custody Prior to Conviction, 77 A.L.R.3d 182 (1977).
2
ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.6(a) (Approved Draft
1968); 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18-4.7(a) (2d ed. 1980); National Advisory
Comm'n on CriminalJustice Standards and Goals, Corrections [hereinafter cited as Nat'l
Advisory Comm'n], Standard 5.8(1) (1973).
3
The following states go beyond this purpose in giving credit as well for any time
that might elapse between the imposition of the sentence by the court and the actual
commencement of the imprisonment: Ark., 111., Ky., Minn., Mo., Mont., N.Y., Ohio
& Ore. For citations, see Appendix to this Comment.
4

See W. G. Nagel, The New Red Bam: A Critical Look at the Modem American
Prison 17-35 (1973); Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, supra note 2, at 3.
5
If the denial of credit on the sentence results in a prison term longer than the
statutory maximum, some courts have held the denial to violate the equal protection
guarantee, especially if the presentence custody could have been avoided if the defendant
had had the financial ability to make bail. See, e.g., Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d
1231 (5th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Gray, 375 F.Supp. 790 (D. Wis. 1974); cf. Mohr v.
Jordan, 370 F.Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974) (credit constitutional^ required without mention
of bail).
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Art. 7

CREDIT FOR TIME OF DETENTION

§ 7.09

suggested that the credit may operate to undermine the rule that
it is necessary for a felony sentence to be no less than one year. 6
The rationale of the one year period relates to the minimum time
needed for correctional programs to have any meaningful impact.
Permitting credit provisions to result in commitments to state
correctional facilities for a lesser period may be thought to risk
undercutting the benefits of these programs. This criticism appears to be of more theoretical than practical significance. The
minimum term is, after all, only a minimum, after which time the
parole board may order release. If the parole board accepts the
view that correctional programs should last at least a year, it
need not release offenders who have spent less than a year in the
programs. New York, in response to this problem, applies the
credit only against that part of the minimum that exceeds one
year, 7 a modification that is faithful to the sentencing philosophy
of the Model Code.
There is an ambiguity in the formulation of Section 7.09(1) that
warrants clarification. The credit is given for detention for "the
crime for which such sentence is imposed." Suppose that a person is arrested and detained for rape but convicted and sentenced
for assault. Obviously if the detention is for the same series of
acts as the sentence, credit should not depend on their being for
the same crime in a narrow sense. Thus, "the crime" in this
subsection should be interpreted to include detention for the same
conduct that ultimately leads to conviction and sentence. The
federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1358 (1976)) more explicitly produces
this conclusion by applying the credit against sentences imposed
not only for the "offense" for which the prisoner has been in custody but also for the "acts" that led to pretrial custody and sentence. Both the American Bar Association and the National Advisory Commission agree with this position, recommending credit
for time spent in custody if the custody and the sentence are based
on the same conduct.8
The second sentence of Subsection (1) requires that the court
be notified by the officer having custody of the defendant of the
total period served by the defendant as a result of the charge.
The court must then take account of the time so served, and may
impose any sentence, up to the statutory maximum, that is appropriate in light of this and all other relevant sentencing factors.
6
See ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.6, Commentary
at 189 (Approved Draft 1968).
7

N.Y. § 70.30(3).

8

ABA Standards (Approved Draft 1968), supra note 2; 3 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice (2d ed. 1980), supra note 2; Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, supra note 2.
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SENTENCING AUTHORITY OF COURT

Art, 7

It is important that the formal mechanism outlined in this section, by which credit for time served prior to sentencing is awarded,
be an integral part of every sentencing proceeding. The automatic operation of this mechanism will not only assure the preservation of statutory limits on sentencing but will also prevent
any misunderstanding on the part of the defendant or the sentencing court as to the meaning of the sentence imposed. Complete understanding of the maximum and minimum limits of any
sentence is crucial to both the defendant and the court at the time
of imposition.
2. Reconvictions and Resentences.
Subsection (2) would
award credit for time served under a conviction that has been set
aside and replaced with another conviction. Although drafted
prior to the decision in North Carolina v. Pearce* the Code
position is in accord with the constitutional requirements of that
decision, namely, that "punishment already exacted must be fully
'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same
offense."10
The principle that supports the award of credit for time served
when the second conviction is for precisely the same offense as
the first also supports the award of credit when a reconviction is
for a lesser included crime or for some other crime arising from
the same conduct. Thus, "the same crime" in Subsection (2) should
be given the same broad reading as "the crime" in Subsection (1).
The Model Code's policy on credit would also extend to a situation
in which a court vacates a sentence and imposes a new one without
vacating the conviction.11
9

395 U.S. 711 (1969). The Pearce case also limits the extent to which a sentence
longer than the former sentence may be imposed upon an offender who has been reconvicted. However, this issue is not involved in the provision under discussion.
10

Id. at 718-19 (footnote omitted).

11

The New York statute, for example, provides for credit in such a situation, N.Y.
§ 70.30(5). Although the ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures
(Approved Draft 1968 & 2d ed. 1980), and the recommendations of the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (Corrections (1973)) have liberal
credit provisions, they make no specific reference to situations in which only the sentence
is vacated. Other revisions that include credit for confinement under vacated conviction
or sentence are as follows: Ariz. § 13-709(C); Haw. § 706-671(2); Minn. § 609.145(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-402 (1979) (where judgment declared
invalid or modified); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.04 (1971); Md. (p) § 70.30(5); Mass. (p)
ch. 264, § 14(b) (where conviction vacated or sentence revised or reviewed); Mich. (2d
p) 1979 Final Draft § 1470(5).
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Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures

18-4.7

need in two respects. First, it directs an award of credit for all time spent
serving an out-of-state sentence since the commission of the crime
unless the sentencing court specifically directed, within the limitations
of subparagraph (b)(1), that the latest sentence be served consecutively.
This credit would be awarded under the procedures of standard 18-6.8
absent a specific direction to the contrary. Second, paragraph (c) proposes that the legislature by statute preclude corrections authorities
from permitting a detainer to have any effect on the conditions under
which an offender will serve the sentence or on consideration of the
offender for parole. Parole to a detainer is a practice already employed
in many jurisdictions, and while parole to continued custody is indeed
inconsistent with the purposes of parole and the fitness of the offender
for such a disposition, it is clear that detention of the offender beyond
the time that the offender would otherwise serve is substantially less
appropriate.15 With respect to prison privileges and other conditions of
serving a sentence, the fact of a detainer — even if filed following indictment in another jurisdiction-—is rarely of any relevance to the
problems that the prisoner poses. Case law has recently begun to restrict
the ability of prison authorities to use detainers in the inmate classification process,16 and this trend should be legislatively codified.17

Standard 18-4.7. Credit for pretrial confinement
(a) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a
result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.
This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody
prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which
the defendant has been committed.
(b) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody under
15. See generally ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §305.24 and comment at 129-134 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1956).
16. Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369
(4th Cir. 1970); Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974); Norris v. Georgia, 357
F. Supp. 1200 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
17. See ABA, >urra note 8, §3.5(c) (restricting use of detainers in classification decisions).
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a prior sentence if the defendant is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the
same conduct. In the case of such a reprosecution, this should
include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent
in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on
the same conduct.
(c) If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of
the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term of
the remaining sentences should be given for all time served since
the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were
based.
(d) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on another charge growing out of conduct which occurred
prior to arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum
term of any sentence resulting from such prosecution should be
given for all time spent in custody under the former charge which
has not been credited against another sentence.
(e) To avoid ambiguities, the award of credit for pretrial incarceration should be automatic and mechanical, and affirmative action
by the sentencing court should be unnecessary. A procedure consistent with this principle is specified in standard 18-6.8.
(f) The policies of sentencing authorities and those of other
agencies empowered to determine the date of actual release
should be carefully coordinated in the area of sentencing credit to
achieve consistency of application and the abolition of any distinction between pretrial and posttrial confinement. In particular,
where the agency administering early release employs guidelines
to determine the presumptive date of such release, credit for pretrial confinement should dso be given against such presumptive
term. To the extent that full integration of policies respecting
sentencing credit is not achieved, the sentencing court should
make corresponding adjustments in the sentence it imposes to
ensure that the defendant who is confined before trial receives
full credit therefor.
(g) These standards do not address the question of whether
credit should be given against the maximum term for good conduct
within the correctional institution or for compliance with institutional rules.
18 • 308
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History of Standard
This is original standard 3.6. There are only stylistic changes, except
that paragraph (f) addresses the new context of parole guidelines and
requires the sentencing court to ascertain that consideration similar to
that required here be required of parole authorities, and if it is not, that
compensating adjustments be made in the sentence imposed.
Related

Standards

ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 10-5.12, 18-6.8
ALI, Model Penal Code §7.09
NAC, Corrections 5.8
NCCUSL, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act §3-502
Commentary
Background
Under a variety of circumstances, time spent in custody as a result of
criminal conduct does not count against the sentence imposed. This may
occur because no statute exists in the jurisdiction granting a credit for
such presentence confinement,1 because the statute is narrowly drafted
and excludes some types of incarceration,2 because the court is pre1. A 1974 ABA survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provide at least partial credit
against the sentence for time spent in jail prior to sentencing; another nine jurisdictions
made the decision discretionary with the trial judge; one state specifically forbade credit;
and another had "no law on the matter." See ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES AND SERVICES, SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE 15 (1974). Federal law

provides a comprehensive credit. See 18 U.S.C. §3568 (1976).
2. Statutes frequently provide that a sentence "shall commence to run upon arrival at
the prison" or shall be for a term of years "in the state penitentiary." See State v. Kennedy,
106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Ex parte Cofield, 42 Ala. App. 344,164 So. 2d 716 (1964).
Other statutes can be read not to give a credit for time spent in a mental hospital for
observation or study prior to sentencing. An ABA survey found only thirty-two statutes
that expressly awarded credit for such incarceration in a mental hospital. SENTENCING
COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 15. For the constitutional arguments that
such a limited crediting system offends due process and equal protection concepts, see
Schomhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
1041 (1972); Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre-Trial Incarceration, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 823 (1972); Comment, Prisoners Rights and Equal Protection, 20 AM. U.L. REV. 482 (19701971). See also Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
Special complications arise in the multijurisdictional context. One decision has denied
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sumed under local law to have taken such confinement into consideration as long as the sentence imposed plus the period of pretrial confinement did not exceed the maximum authorized sentence,3 or because the
recognized constitutional case law in the circuit requires a credit for
pretrial confinement only where the crime is a "bailable" one.4 Whatever the reason, there is today only partial recognition of the principle
endorsed here that distinctions between pretrial and posttrial confinement should be irrelevant.
It is the purpose of this standard to end such technical distinctions by
granting a comprehensive credit that treats all periods of confinement
attributable to the underlying criminal transaction as equivalent, no
matter what label is attached to such incarceration. To this end, paragraph (a) requires the credit to be offset against both the minimum and
maximum terms imposed, and paragraph (f) seeks to integrate the policies of sentencing and parole authorities so that such confinement will
similarly reduce any presumptive guideline term used by parole authorities.
There are several reasons for this standard's attempt to standardize
practices with respect to sentencing credits. First, and most common, is
that pretrial detention is related to indigency. Thus, to ignore the pretrial incarceration of the indigent offender is to permit discrimination
based on economic status, which, regardless of the extensive debate
a credit against a federal sentence for time spent in state custody pending a trial under
a federal detainer issued with respect to the same federal conviction. See Bruss v. Harris,
479 F.2d 392 (10th Or. 1973). For criticism of this denial, see Note, Bruss p. Harris: No
Federal Credit for Time Spent in State Custody — The Effect of a Federal Detainer, 1973 UTAH L. REV.
473. Clearly such time is causally related to the federal conviction, but the court held
that the credit had been exhausted by applying it against the concurrent state sentence.
See note 24 infra. In general, federal courts now give a credit for time spent in a state
prison under a federal detainer. See O'Connor v. Attorney General, 470 F.2d 732 (5th
Cir. 1972).
3. Compare Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Willingham,
415 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1969); Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970); State
v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 244
A.2d 468 (1968); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968). More recent
cases refusing to adopt such a presumption are discussed at note 8 infra.
4. See, e.g., Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d
1231 (5th Cir. 1976). Although it can be argued that there is no invidious discrimination
involved where credit is denied for a nonbailable offense, since the rich and the poor are
treated alike, commentators have pointed out that the case for "jail time" credits rests on
other constitutional foundations besides that of equal protection. See Comment, Credit for
Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1148 (1973).
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over its constitutionality, is unwise and unjust. Second, the least drastic
means principle also has an application in this context. "Jail time" serves
most recognized penological goals equally well as does prison time, and
in fact is generally understood to represent a qualitatively harsher form
of confinement than prison custody. To fail to credit it thus results in
confinement in excess of the minimum necessary to realize deterrent,
incapacitative, or retributive purposes. A third argument arises when
the issue is whether custody under a prior invalid conviction should be
credited. In principle, the government should have at least a moral
obligation to recompense the offender for time wrongfully served under
an invalid conviction, and it can only make restitution by permitting
such a credit.5 Additionally, to the extent that credit is not awarded
comprehensively for all forms of custody relating to the criminal charge
for which the sentence is imposed, an unfortunate opportunity for
abuse arises. The possibility cannot be wholly ignored that atypical
forms of presentence confinement (such as detention in a psychiatric
institution for observation or treatment) might be themselves used as
a punishment in order "to manipulate time factors in sentencing."6
Finally, credit not given for confinement awaiting appeal may result in
a chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal the conviction.7
Constitutional Developments
Since the first edition, the most important developments concerning
sentence credits involve the constitutional claim that denial of credit for
jail time violates the equal protection clause. A number of circuit court
decisions have accepted this argument,8 although some decisions have
5. A similar position was taken by the National Advisory Commission. See NAC,
CORRECTIONS, commentary at 171. In most situations such a credit will also be constitutionally required by North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
6. L. FARMER, OBSERVATION AND STUDY 4 (1977). See also Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1974).
7. Statutes denying credit pending appeal are collected in Whalen, Resentence Without
Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. REV. 239, 246 n.40 (1951).
Contemporary statutes do not expressly deny credit for time pending appeal, but by
delaying the sentence's commencement until the arrival of the prisoner at the state prison,
they may make possible substantially the same outcome. See SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS
AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 19. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
8. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006
(1971) (memorandum), remanding to United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971);
Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1039-1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Ham v. North Carolina, 471
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limited this rule to bailable offenses. The rationale for the latter distinction is that the rich and the poor alike are incarcerated pending trial for
nonbailable offenses and thus no discrimination results when credit for
such jail time is denied.9 Neither these standards nor the Pretrial Release
standards approve of this distinction. In essence, such a distinction
legitimizes preventive detention based only on the category of the
offense. Preventive confinement is subject to attack on a variety of other
constitutional theories,10 and its impact should be minimized by recompensing the defendant through a credit against the sentence. Failure
to do so also creates often unjustified disparities between offenders
convicted of bailable and nonbailable offenses, since the difference in
the gravity of the respective offenses committed by these two classes
may be modest in comparison with the difference in treatment they
thereby receive.
An even more significant limitation on the development of a comprehensive credit for presentence custody is the rule followed in several
circuits that, if the actual sentence imposed plus the period of presentence custody did not exceed the statutory maximum, then a presumption arises that the court gave credit for the presentence time.11 Such a
presumption may occasionally conform with the court's actual intent,
but it is at least equally possible that the court simply overlooked the
presentence custody already served or at least failed to give this question the serious attention it warrants. In any event, recent decisions have
refused to accept this line of reasoning and have held that such a
presumption may not be used to overcome what the courts saw as a
constitutional right.12 These standards have always agreed with this
latter position and so provide in standard 18-6.8 for the automatic
crediting of presentence custody without any inquiry into the court's
probable intent.
The position of the Supreme Court on the constitutional status of jail
time credit is less certain. In McGinnis v. Royster, the Court upheld a New
F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); Wright v.
Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970); Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149
(D. Md. 1974); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971); White v. Gilligan, 351
F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
9. See note 4 supra.
10. See Comment, supra note 4. See also commentary to standard 18-3.2.
11. See cases collected at note 3 supra.
12. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir.
1976); Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1974).
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York statute that denied good time credit to state prisoners for time
spent in presentence custody in county jails.13 In so doing, it noted that
since the good time credit system was designed to reflect a prisoner's
performance in prison rehabilitation programs, a rational basis existed
for its denial to presentence custody in county jails that lacked equivalent rehabilitative facilities.
Distinctions, of course, exist between good time and jail time credits.
The latter is a far less important right to the offender because the
offender is generally parole eligible by the point such credits would
require release, and the majority of offenders are released through the
parole process rather than by the expiration of the statutory maximum
less good time credits. In contrast to the issue of jail time that reduces
the minimum period all offenders must serve, good time generally only
becomes applicable if, after an individualized assessment by the parole
agency, the offender has been deemed sufficiently culpable or dangerous
on his or her own merits to require further confinement. Even in this
special context of good time credits, subsequent decisions have distinguished McGinnis on the grounds that the case turned on the unique
character of the New York statute with its special emphasis on rehabilitation.14 An earlier memorandum decision by the Court at least suggests
that where credit against the minimum term is at issue the Court will
be less prepared to accept references to the statutory purposes of
confinement as a permissible basis on which to treat more harshly those
unable to make bail.15 The majority of commentators have also seen
McGinnis as limited in its application and have argued that a constitutional right to credit for presentence custody now exists.16

Statutory Developments
Statutory developments since the first edition still show the same
diversity of approaches with respect to sentencing credits. A 1974 ABA
13. 410 U.S. 263 (1973). But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), afid. en banc,
470 F.2d 1182 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considerations, 71
Nw. U.L. REV. 29 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law — Sentencing — Withholding Good Time Credit
from Prisoners Awaiting Appeal, 51 TEX. L. REV. 348 (1973); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State
Criminal Defendant — A Constitutional Requirement, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 593 n.35 (1973).
15. Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971); for the decision after remand, see
United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971).
16. See sources cited at notes 12 & 14 supra.
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survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provided at least partial credit
against the sentence for time spent in jail before sentencing,17 nine made
the decision discretionary with the trial judge, and only one specifically
forbade such credit.18 Some thirty-two states also gave explicit credit for
time spent in a mental hospital, three others did so by administrative
practice, and six declined to give such credit.19 The computation of the
credit also varies among jurisdictions. Older statutes still provide that
the sentence commences "upon arrival at the prison," and by so focusing on time spent at a specific institution they have been narrowly
interpreted to deny all credits.20 Unfortunately, many jurisdictions that
do grant credit in some form for jail time fail to specify procedures for
its determination or award. Thus, it is judicial case law that establishes
the operative presumption, often in a way that narrows the statutory
grant.21
Detention Prior to Service of Sentence
The position taken in paragraphs (a) and (b) is codified in 18 U.S.C.
§3568 and has been similarly endorsed by the Brown Commission22 and
the National Advisory Commission.23 This consensus obviates further
explanation of why denial of credit for presentence custody is unfair.
Current federal law, however, does not grant credit for custody under
a different and unrelated charge on which a defendant is arrested and
confined but not convicted, although such confinement occurs after the
commission of the crime for which the sentence was imposed. Paragraph (d) recommends that credit also be awarded in this situation as
well, and the Brown Commission agrees.24 There are several reasons for
17. SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 15.

18. II
19. Id
20. Id. at 15-16. But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), affd. en banc, 470 F.2d
1182 (1973).
21. See. e.g.. State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden, 4
Md. App. 629, 244 A.2d 468 (1968); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1968).
22. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT §3205

(1971).
23. NAC, CORRECTIONS 5.S; see also NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT

§3-502.
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, §3205(3); see also NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS ACT §3-502(C). Both the Brown Commission and the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act agree, however, that the offender should "not receive credit for the same
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this recommendation. In some instances, the unrelated charge that went
unprosecuted may have served as a kind of holding category, while the
crime for which sentence was actually imposed may have been "the
undisclosed basis for the first arrest."25 Even if this is not the case,
failure to credit the time served under the offense for which there was
no conviction gives rise to an inequitable forfeiture by the offender.
This also violates the least drastic means principle, since such time
equally well serves any legitimate correctional purpose. Potentially, the
offender is exposed to a label game under which confinement can in
effect be enhanced depending on the characterization placed on some
portion of the presentence custody.
One limit on this recommendation should be made clear: time served
prior to the commission of the instant offense should not be credited,
even if wrongfully served, since this might permit an offender to "bank"
time against a future offense.
As a practical matter, the recommendation in paragraph (d) will seldom interfere with the flexibility accorded sentencing authorities, but
will instead provide assurance that they have given adequate attention
to a relevant factor. The only instance where a mandatory credit for
such "dead time" will legally limit the authority of the sentencing court
will be when such time plus the sentence the court wishes to impose
exceeds the statutory authorized maximum, and it is exactly in such
instances where a forfeiture of the prior time spent incarcerated seems
most inequitable.26 In other situations, the court will still have the
time more than once/' NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, comment to
§3-502. These standards concur, and this is the intent underlying the final clause in
paragraph (d), referring to time "which has not been credited against another sentence."
However, it should be noted that where multiple sentences are made to run concurrently,
it is certainly not the intent of this standard to award the credit against one of two
concurrent sentences and require its denial against the other. Given the tendency for the
same criminal transaction to violate overlapping statutes (e.g., one proscribing mail fraud
and the other wire fraud), such an absurd interpretation could frequently render the basic
principle of this standard meaningless. But in other situations (such as where the second
prosecution follows the expiration of the first sentence and the criminal conduct leading
to the current sentence occurred prior to the arrest of the first charge), the legitimate
interests of the defendant are amply protected by a single crediting. For a case illustrating
the dangers of a doctrinaire approach to this single crediting rule, see Bruss v. Harris, 479
F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1973) (credit for pretrial state confinement under a federal detainer
denied where such time was credited against a state sentence concurrent with the federal
sentence).
25. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, comment to §3205.
26. Cf. Tinin v. United States, 361 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1966); Short v. United States, 344
F.2d 550, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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authority to exceed the recommended guideline range, although its
explanation for such a departure will have to cite plausible factors.
One other aspect of paragraph (a) deserves special emphasis. Credit
should be awarded in instances where special treatment is imposed, or
special diagnosis required, as a result of the conduct underlying the
criminal charge. The "pending sentence" language would clearly include, for example, any time an offender spends in a diagnostic facility
for the purpose of having a report compiled under a provision like that
suggested in standard 18-5.6. A narrower statutory credit might unfortunately cause the diagnostic facility to be used as a means of extending
short sentences. It is also intended that credit be required if a defendant
is later convicted of an offense on the basis of conduct for which the
defendant has already been committed. Many of the sex offender statutes described in the commentary to standard 18-2.5 would permit the
criminal prosecution to proceed and a normal sentence to be imposed
after the defendant has been released from a "civil" commitment for the
same conduct. While these standards by no means approve of such
provisions, if they are to be used at all, further criminal proceedings
should at least count the time the offender has been civilly restrained
for the same underlying conduct. The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation
Act of 1966 recognizes this principle by giving credit for any period of
civil commitment for addiction against any criminal confinement based
on the same conduct if criminal proceedings follow the civil commitment.27

Detention Under a Prior Invalid Sentence
Paragraph (b) addresses the resentencing situation where a prior conviction or sentence has been held invalid. Historically, some cases once
took the position that such confinement could be ignored since there
was no legal sentence of which the law had to take note.28 The reducHo
ad absurdum consequences of this line of reasoning were effectively ridiculed in a classic statement in King v. United States:
The Government's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that
because thefirstsentence was void appellant "has served no sentence but
has merely spent time in the penitentiary"; that since he should not have
been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all. . . . As other
27. See 28 U.S.C §2903(d) (1976).
28. See Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913).
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§ 3585,

Calculation of a term of imprisonment

(a) Commencement of sentence.—A sentence to a term of imprisonment
commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at,
the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.
(b) Credit for prior custody.—A defendant shall be given credit toward
the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was
arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
(Added Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2001.)
Historical Note
Effective Date. See section 235(a)(1) of
Pub.L. 98-473, set out as a note under section 3551 of this title.

Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of Pub.L. 98-473, see 1984 U.S.
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 3182.
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